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Abstract
The study intends to explore the connection between China’s energy security, 
21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), and its anticipated impacts on 
Indo-US strategic perception in the Indian Ocean region. China’s economic 
prosperity and industrial boom is fomenting different variables to upset the 
U.S. led world order. In the back drop of energy security as core national 
interest, Chinese leadership has exceptionally focused the maritime domain. 
In addition to this, for uninterrupted industrial growth, China largely relies on 
energy imports that have turned its attention to the strategic value of the Sea 
lines of communication (SLOCs). However, China’s newly emerged interests 
and subsequent investment in different sea ports along the oceanic supply 
chain of Indian Ocean is fuelling Indo-US strategic distrust in the region. The 
study concludes that China’s carefully crafted Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is to 
challenge the status quo to protect its (China) core national interests in Indian 
Ocean The divergence of strategic interests in Indian Ocean is heralding a 
new multipart strategic competition that will transform the Indian Ocean into 
breeding ground for naval arm race. To understand the shifting geo political 
realities, the researchers used the Power Transition theory.
Keywords: Indian Ocean region, 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), 
Energy Security, Power Transition, 
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Introduction
Dr.Zbigniew Brzezinski, Pre-
sident Jimmy Carter’s national 
security adviser, described that 
world power configuration has been 
taking change for the 5th time since 
20th century. In the on-going power 
transition from Unipolar to the 
polycentric structure, the unfolding 
uncertainties, strategic value of 
SLOCs, sophisticated technologies, 
the desperate need of Blue Water 
navies for the projection of offshore 
power have profoundly complicated 
the sense of insecurity and security 
more than ever existed in the 
past. Pointing to the geo-political 
epicentre for competition, Robert 
D. Kaplan in his article entitled, the 
21stcentury geo-strategist in “Centre 
Stage for the 21st Century” viewed 
that due to residence for preeminent 
energy and trade interstate seaway, 
Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is where 
global struggles will play out in the 
twenty-first century (Kaplan, 2009).
IOR is the third largest oceanic 
body enclosed by Asia, Australia 
and Africa continents. The region 
hosts nuclear powers both declared 
and undeclared, witnesses the 
competition of extra-territorial 
powers i.e. Sino-America, is the 
inhabitant of some of the largest oil, 
coal and natural gas producers while 
at the same time energy starving 
states. In the emerging geopolitical 
theatre of India Ocean, India’s 
geographic position at the center 
along other ingredients of national 
power catapulted it on advantageous 
locus. Apart from its favorable geo-
strategic position, India has some 
hiccups as well. India’s territorial 
conflicts with nuclear arch rivals 
Pakistan and China are one of the 
strategic impediments in the way of 
its “great power” ambition. In the 
extra-regional actors, America is 
the most powerful contender having 
French and British in reserve. 
According to the US Department 
of Defense Base Structure Report 
US has ensured its presence in 12 
different locations in IOR- Diego 
Garcia, five in Persian Gulf, three in 
Africa and three on the eastern rim. 
Next to the US, China’s growing 
dependency for energy imports 
and trade exports on India Ocean 
prompted it to take urgent and fast 
track measures to secure its interests 
in Indian Ocean. China is the 
world's second-largest consumer of 
oil and surpassed the United States 
as the world’s largest net importer of 
oil in 2014 (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2015). China is 
struggling hard to establish its naval 
presence across the IOR. China 
established its first external naval 
outpost in Djibouti and installed 
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“a few thousand" troops and staff 
at its first ever overseas military 
base. Apart from Djibouti, China 
has been enormously investing in 
other maritime ports, which in 
large numbers are spotted around 
Indian Ocean (Beckhusen, 2018). 
The presence of the vital powers and 
their higher and uncompromising 
stakes has made India Ocean a 
significant 21st century water body 
with diverging strategic interests. 
Indian Ocean holds multiple 
strategic, commercial and trans-
portation significance. The region 
is a pivotal conduit for global 
energy and trade shipments those 
shoulders 40% of the world oil 
supply and 90,000 commercial fleets 
annually. Infested/swarm over by 
important choke points (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA), 
2017), IO is the matter of dead and 
life in context of energy security for 
developing states of the new power 
structure. The presence of the global 
hegemon US, exclusive strategic 
claims of ambitious India and 
China’s inroad in the region have 
made Indian Ocean converging 
region of bedrock concerns. In 
the wake of China’s interests in 
the oceans, MSR is taken the vital 
instrument of China’s quest for 
maritime superiority accompanied 
by naval modernization to balance 
the possible threat of the Indo-US 
nexus in IOR in case of blockade. 
The conflicts of interests, in IOR, are 
sharpening the strategic rift further 
and overwhelming the initiated 
joint mechanisms to evolve a 
liberal maritime paradigm between 
the diverging stakeholders India, 
America and China in IOR.
Theoretical Framework 
Power Transition Theory (PTT)
The power transition theory 
is an attempt to highlight the pos-
sibility of conflict in international 
system by distinguishing between 
dominant power(s) and potential 
challengers. Power transition theory 
was first posited by A.F.K. Organski 
in ‘World Politics’ (Organski, 1958) 
in late 1950s and has further been 
focused in ‘Power Transitions: 
Strategies for the 21st Century’ 
(Ammen, 2000). Power Transition 
Theory is anti-thesis of ‘Balance 
of Power’ that was called as basic 
principal of international relations.
Power Transition Theory 
(PTT) like realism does not see 
world system as anarchical rather 
hierarchically organized similar to 
domestic system. In system smaller 
states recognize the power potential 
of dominant nation(s) based on 
different power capabilities. It also 
recognises that international and 
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domestic systems are governed by 
similar rules. Like domestic system, 
political parties struggle for power, 
in international system states are 
in constant competition for scarce 
resources. Power transition con-
ceives international competition as 
driven by the potential net gains, the 
overall improvement observed in 
some measure after all positive and 
negative influences have been fully 
accounted for, that could be accrued 
from conflict or cooperation 
(Jacek&Organski, 1989).
The most importance aspect of 
power transition theory is hierarchy 
in international system. Organski 
visualizes the international system 
as pyramid. As one moves down 
from the top, the number of states 
will be increasing down ward. 
At apex rung, the most powerful 
state(s) are designed and designated 
as “Dominant Nation”. Dominant 
state(s), ‘the one has total ingredients 
of national power in true sense’ 
and in the end is placed the least 
powerful. Dominant state(s) sets 
the rules for international order. 
Such state(s) has military prowess 
that can be projected far from its 
shorelines, economic prosperity, 
seductive culture that entice the 
other states of lower rungs, and an 
attractive political model. Dominant 
state(s) confirms the requirement of 
both ‘Hard Power’ and ‘Soft Power’. 
It is the main runner of the show in 
international order.
On the second rung of the 
pyramid great powers reside, those 
states which have also massive 
resources but at a time one on one 
cannot match the dominant state(s). 
As their names convey these states 
are also powerful but weaker than 
the dominant power(s). Great 
powers also share the benefits of the 
international system but less than 
that of dominant power. Dominant 
power(s) needs their diplomatic, 
economic and military support for 
sustaining their status of global 
hegemon in international system. 
The most important thing about 
these states is their potential to be 
the future dominant state(s). 
Down the great powers, mid dle 
powers stand in hierarchy. These-
powers are second rank powers 
Australia, Germany, Japan and 
India. Allthese state have economic 
and security assurances and certain 
benefits for their survival and 
prestige in prevailing international 
order. Further down to great 
powers, middle and small powers 
come. Although small powers align 
themselves with current inter-
national order however largely feel 
dissatisfied from it.
Imran Khan, Muhammad Imran & Hamid Iqbal
Geo-Political Checkmate in the Indian Ocean Region 569
Furthermore, Organski’s 
Pyramid bifurcates great and middle 
powers into satisfied and dissatisfied 
powers. Firstly, stands those great 
powersand middle powers which 
are satisfied from prevailing inter-
national order and allied with the 
dominant power(s). Some of the 
great and middle powers e.g. India, 
Great Britain , Japan, South Korea, 
Saudi Arabia are satisfied and allied 
themselves with US (hegemon) 
to share the global leadership and 
extract maximum benefits from the 
system. Organski calls these states 
the most powerful and satisfied 
states.
On the other side of spectrum, 
some of the greatand middle powers 
do not feel satisfaction from current 
international system. They do not 
think that the running system is 
fulfilling the desired level of their 
satisfaction. They see themselves 
on receiving position and think 
are being exploited by current 
international order. In current 
scenario this group consistsof Chi-
na, Russia, and Iran etc.great powers 
of this groups are called ‘powerful 
and dissatisfied’ while middle 
powers of the group is called ‘weak 
and dissatisfied’.
 Thedissatisfied category gangs 
up and springs up as real challenger 
of hegemon. When nations are di-
s satisfied and at the same time 
powerful enough to possess the 
means of doing something about 
their dissatisfaction, trouble can 
be expected (Organski, 1968, p. 
328). In current international 
order China’s economic growth, 
military modernization, creeping 
assertiveness, and being far away 
from the true political moderniza-
tion on western lines have been 
patching it as true challenger to the 
US. 
PTT contends the notion that 
the power of a nation cannot increase 
unless it wins a war or makes new 
alliance. One of major assumptions 
of its arguments is the impetus for 
the power originates within the 
states. It is industrialization that 
makes a nation more powerful and 
the most powerful nations of the 
world are industrialized nations. 
An industrial growth of the different 
states largely contributes in altering 
the global power structure. So the 
more rapid will be industrialization, 
the fast change will be observed in 
the global power structure. 
In 21st century, alongside the 
changing sands of geo politics, 
shifting epicentres of powers, re-
placing of old alliances by new 
one , the century is also witnessing 
industrial revolution at its pinnacle. 
Industrialization brings great po-
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wer to the nations undergoing it 
(Organski, 1968, p. 301). Chinese 
industrial growth has made it able 
to knock the door that opens to the 
status of the dominant state. 
At global level, rising China has 
been threatening the US dominancy. 
Dissatisfied great and middle powers 
under China’s auspicious started to 
gang up against dominant power 
(America). Some of the symptoms 
of resentment have already been 
taken at a snail pace movement. 
Sometimes diplomatic statements 
and other times overt and blatant 
denials of US moves have sowed the 
seeds of multi-polar world. 
In Indian Ocean Region (IOR) 
China and American started to 
counter each other through regional 
states. US have declared India as 
linchpin for her rebalancing policy 
and multiple times America has 
expressed her firm commitments for 
making India a great power. While 
on the other side, China has been 
bolstering Pakistan’s navy in IOR. 
The frequency of defence treaties, 
naval exercises and arm sales are 
scaling up with every passing day 
in the region. Massive population 
over stretched land, rich history and 
above all Indian’s aspirations to be 
a greatpower; are few among many 
variables that makeit a suitable 
strategic western paw to counter 
China. Both, India and China have 
also flashpoints that intermittently 
ignited border skirmishes and both 
fought a war in 1962. Suffice to say 
US policy to contain China would 
be up to some extent incomplete 
or at least in greater troubles in the 
absence of India.
Wars occur when a great power 
in a secondary position challenges 
the top nation and its allies for 
control (Organski, 1968, p. 325).
China’s quest for separate economic 
institutions, military alliances and 
strategic agreements with different 
small, middle and other dissatisfied 
great powers are manifestations of 
her dissatisfaction from status quo 
and projection of a revisionist power 
along Russia .Besides, intermittently 
it has flexed her diplomatic muscles 
sundry times. Keeping in mind 
uncalculated price of the war, China 
adopted at-odd-but-not-at-war 
approach with America. In US-Iran 
nuclear deadlock China supported 
Iran and on sundry occasions in 
soft manners conveyed her message 
to Washington. In Syrian case, 
China has vetoed several US moved 
resolutions in UNSC. Similarly in 
the South China Sea, China denied 
ICJ verdict in Sino-Philippine 
maritime dispute. China’s colossal 
strategicstrides in IOR have long 
been serving as glue for US-India 
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relations region.On one side Indo-
US joint anti-Chinese submarine 
surveillance mechanism in Indian 
Ocean reminds China its maritime 
vulnerabilities. To overcome its 
vulnerabilities in waters; Mari time 
Silk Road (MSR) is an impor tant 
strategic-cum-economic instru-
ment. 
Power Transition’s Assumptions 
PTT claims that the possibility 
of war increases manifolds when 
rising power dissatisfied from 
prevailing international order 
and determine to upset it. The 
situation becomes worse when 
dissatisfied rising power achieves 
approximate balance of power with 
the dominant power. In past, in 
WWI and WWII dissatisfied rising 
powers challenged the dominant 
before achieving credible balance 
of power, and that adventure ended 
in disaster. However, if challenger 
gets larger muscles that ensure 
her dominance, the dominant 
power remains hesitant to fight the 
challenger which mitigates the risk 
of conflict (Organski, 1968, p. 334). 
In such situations the signs appear 
before challenger claims or fight for 
dominance. 
The power gap between rising 
China and America is still to cover 
a lot. Although, China emerged 
as economic challenger of US, 
however, the other ingredients 
of national power still tilts into 
American favour. 
Second assumption, PTT claims 
that rapid and sudden growth of 
a challenger in single generation 
does not let dominant power to 
take peaceful precautionary steps 
for sustaining peace in prevailing 
international order. The potential, 
location and size of China have 
been in discussion in US since long.
Back in 1949, US embarked to get 
China isolated in its first 30 years. 
In early 50s,both had face off over 
Korean peninsula. However, in 60s 
Sino-Russo split paved the ground 
for the Sino-US joint venture against 
common adversary Soviet Union. 
In short, Sino-US relations have 
stretched over decades and both are 
well aware of each other’s strategic 
cultures. The principle of rapid rise 
in single generation that enhances 
the possibility of war between rising 
and dominant nations is quite 
dimly applicable in Sino-American 
case. The Chinese growth has track 
record of almost six decades and US 
has been shaping and reshaping its 
China centric policies accordingly. 
Sometimes Self exaggerated 
sense of rising power makes it blind 
and during inebriation of growth 
it may miscalculates the actual 
capabilities of dominant power. 
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Chinese mature and cautious 
approach has nullified this strategic 
mistake. China never flexed its 
muscles aggressively against great 
powers but in extreme exceptions. 
China is very cautiously projecting 
its image and never exaggerated 
to lead or outwit its geopolitical 
rivals. Its century’s long struggles 
had already made it able to define 
itself being responsible nation in 
international community of nations.
The degree of friendship 
between the dominant and 
challenging nations also contributes 
in peaceful transformation of 
international order. The power 
transformation from British to 
US was peacefulbecause of their 
congruent political systems and 
civilizations. However, in Sino-
US power transition, both have 
different political, administrative 
systems, and military objectives. 
Both are representative of different 
political systems and values
The stark difference between 
Sino-US culture, norms and over 
again US pressing for Chinese 
political modernization are major 
symptoms of their anticipated future 
conflict. Above of all, adjusting with 
alien political system need greater 
changes and for a larger nation like 
China or US it would be impossible 
to submit voluntarily to their 
counter values.
Energy Security as a Strategic 
Concern 
Energy security, broadly 
defined, means adequate, affordable 
and reliable supplies of energy 
(International Energy Agency, 
2007). It matters because, today, 
to keep continue the smooth and 
ensured growth of economies, 
industries and transport sector from 
maritime to aerial and battlefield 
vehicles, energy security has become 
top priority concomitant to others 
in foreign policy making circles. 
Being mover of every kind of state’s 
wheel, for various states energy 
became as influential strategic tool 
to secure their national interests 
either through blackmailing others 
(in Russia case and European Union 
case) or as core national interest in 
Chinese case. Energy security has 
acquired the status of an essential 
variable in on-going geopolitical 
contest and that pitched various 
states against other either to protect 
energy sources, markets or transit 
routes.
In this regard, the former 
US President Richard Nixon 
rightly pointed out that Security 
and economic considerations are 
inevitably linked and energy cannot 
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be separated from eitherr (Bromley, 
1991, p. vii). Historical evidence 
confirms his remarks in relation 
to the importance of energy. In the 
18th century, European continent 
with mesmerized momentum 
had embarked on astronomical 
industrialization process. The 
catalyst for the stimulated indus-
trialization was coal-powered 
technologies. Coal was at the centre 
of the Industrial Revolution and 
perhaps in recorded history first 
time human translated energy 
into desired outcome. The coal-
generated industrialization process 
was culminated in to advanced 
weapons, capitalism, luxurious 
goods and cumulative result was 
industrial growth, seductive life 
style and the dominancy of west 
in every aspect. Coal was primary 
mean to run steam engines, heat 
buildings, to power transportation 
sector and became the vital engine 
of entire industrial revolution.
 Meanwhile, energy being 
important element to keep moving 
war machinery the consideration for 
the diversification of energy sources 
had started to take roots. The first 
recorded example of diversification 
or shifting the source of energy from 
coal to oil can be traced to Winston 
Churchil’s instruction to First Sea 
Lord Admiral Jackie Fisher: “You 
have got to find the oil; to show how 
it can be stored cheaply: how it can 
be purchased regularly & cheaply in 
peace and with absolute certainty 
during war (Munson, 2015)”
For the first time, Churchill 
had shifted Royal Navy ships from 
coal to Persian oil as its source of 
propulsion (Yergin, 2005, p. 52). 
The sole purpose for this shift was 
to make more efforts to outwit and 
out-fight German naval fleets. So 
energy security became the source 
of strategic concerns since onset of 
the modern strategic competition 
even prior to WWI. 
In context of energy security, 
maritime and continental routes 
of Indian Ocean have acquired 
remarkable strategic ascendancy 
for involved Troika (producers, 
consumers and transit states). In 
this equation some states- Saudi 
Arabia, Russia, Myanmar, Sri 
Lanka, Djibouti, Japan and China 
- have acquired more geo-strategic-
cum-economic importance for 
providing one of the important 
tools e.g. reliable arrangements for 
pipelines, lands routs, sea ports (to 
circumvent possible terrorist and 
strategic threats or to reduce transit 
cost) or ensured supply or potential 
markets. 
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Geographical Diversity as Threat 
to SLOCs 
The variable of the geographical 
dispersion of energy sources further 
compound the energy security 
dilemma for many developed and 
developing stakeholders. In many 
cases the unequal and tortuous 
dispersion of energy not only 
gives more leverage to transit 
states as compare to producers 
and consumers but also increases 
the possibilities of the military 
threats in context of blockade. The 
largest Shale oil and gas reserves 
are discovered on North American 
Continent(U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), 2013), the 
oil elephants are concentrated in 
the Middle East, however, Brazil, 
Venezuela, America, Russia, and 
Central Asia also hold sizeable 
fraction (WorldAtlas, 2019) and the 
largest natural gas reserves reside in 
Central Asia and Russia. All these 
far flung energy reserves demand 
secure routes and ensured supply 
for both consumers and producers. 
In the past on various occasions, 
the stable flow of energy has been 
disrupted or threatened to be 
disrupted by rival factions. South 
East Asian, Somali pirates(BBC, 
2011) and Iranian government in 
case of US-Iran war multiple times 
threatened to disrupt the sea borne 
supply lanes.
The process of massive indus-
trialization and growing dependence 
on energy in the incumbent evolving 
polycentric structure is shifting 
focus from the land based security 
measures to the waters. Maritime 
routes as the cheapest source for 
transportation and potential target 
to cripple adversaries’ economies 
has been fuelling the greater than 
ever sense of maritime insecurity 
in various states. The massive naval 
presences of American fleets in the 
target rich water channels, China 
and Indian unceasing struggles for 
greater naval muscles have been 
posing grave threats to the already 
disturbed waters of Indian Ocean. 
However, arm race to protect the 
energy lanes further complicate the 
Indian Ocean’s power politics. That’s 
further disturbance will further 
the already perceived threats to 
the SLOCs which back and forth 
energy from geographically distance 
locations. 
China and the Seas: A Growing 
De pendence
According to Energy Infor-
mation Administration (eia), nearly 
59 million barrels per day (b/d) of 
global petroleum and other liquids 
production moved on maritime 
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routes in 2015, or almost 61% of 
the world total. Much of this volume 
transited Suez Canal and SUMED 
Pipeline, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, 
and the Strait of Hormuz. A large 
volume of China’s energy imports 
from remote regions are coming 
home through different maritime 
routs, maximum of which pass across 
greater Indian Ocean. China is the 
world's most populous country with 
a fast-growing economy that has led 
it to be the largest energy consumer 
and producer in the world.
China’s economic boom made 
it as unusual economic challenger 
to the centuries-old economic giant, 
the US. Being manufacturing-based 
economy whose rapid growth is 
moderating energy consumption 
(Deng, 2018) and energy deficit 
state, China surpassed US as 
largest global energy consumer in 
2010. The U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) reports that 
China surpassed the United States at 
the end of 2013 as the world's largest 
net importer of petroleum and other 
liquids, in part because of China's 
rising oil consumption. China 
surpassed South Korea to become 
the world’s second-largest importer 
of liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
in 2017, according to data from 
IHS Markit and official Chinese 
government statistics (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA), 
2018). China surpassed the U.S. 
in annual gross crude oil imports 
in 2017 by importing 8.4 million 
barrels per day (b/d) compared 
with 7.9 million b/d of U.S. crude oil 
imports (The Maritime Executive, 
2018).
According to Energy Infor-
mation Administration (EIA), in 
2015 China imported 23% of its oil 
requirement from Africa, second 
bigger source for Chinese oil import 
after Middle East with 52%. All these 
imports were transited to maritime 
routes. Pentagon’ 2016 annual report 
to Congress noted: “Given China’s 
growing energy demand, new 
pipelines will alleviate only slightly 
China’s maritime dependency … 
the sheer volume of oil and liquefied 
natural gas that is imported … will 
make strategic SLOCs increasingly 
important to China(Office of 
Military Commissions Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, 2016).” 
Chinese energy imports from Africa 
and Middle East are to pass all the 
way through important navigational 
choke points. During any crisis, 
energy disruption to China can 
cause mammoth jolt in its economic 
might and if not possible in reality 
But sword will still be lingering on 
China.
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A threat perception has 
developed in Chinese elites in 
relation to its heavy dependence 
of energy imports on various 
maritime routes, 80% (Davis, 2014) 
(in addition to much of its trade) 
of which comes in China through 
Malacca straits. President Hu 
Jintao, during a speech at a military 
academy in 2004, termed this heavy 
dependence for China on one single 
strait as “Malacca Dilemma” and has 
been considered a potential threat 
to the free flow of energy resources 
into China.
Sustainable economic growth 
is as an important component of 
China’s rise and social cohesion. 
China’s economic rise is the 
outcome of its unprecedented 
industrialization pace and 
continuous supply of the energy mix 
to keep move the industries. The 
Uninterrupted supply of the energy 
is vital element for this sustainable 
economic growth. 
Many high profile office holders 
in China specifically pointed out 
China’s core interest in their formal 
writings, whitepapers and CPC’s 
plenary sessions. On December 
6, 2010, Dai Bingguo 
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Uninterrupted supply of the energy is vital 
element for this sustainable economic growth.  
Many high profile office holders in 
China specifically pointed out China‟s core 
interest in their formal writings, whitepapers 
and CPC‟s plenary sessions. On December 6, 
2010, ai (戴秉国) published an 
article entitled "We Must Stick to the Path of 
Peaceful Development" on the official 
website of China's Foreign Ministry. He 
wrote: 
In my view, no development path 
should be chosen at the expense of major 
national interests, core interests in particular. 
What are China's core interests? My personal 
understanding is: First, China's form of 
government and political system and stability, 
namely the CPC leadership, the socialist 
system and socialism with Chinese 
characteristics; second, China's sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and national unity; third, 
the basic guarantee for sustainable economic 
and social development of China. No 
violation of these interests will be allowed 
(Bingguo, 2010). 
On September 6, 2011, the State 
Council released a white paper entitled 
China's Peaceful Development, which once 
again defined and highlighted ensured 
ensuring sustainable economic as Chin‟s core 
national interests along others(White Paper, 
2011). Chinese policy making circle views 
energy security in both strategic and 
economic terms to keep industries moving for 
sustainable economic development. 
In the backdrop of its strategic-
vulnerability in terms of energy security, 
China has long since been investing in 
different sea ports along the important SLOCs 
for commercial purposes. How many of these 
ports situated either India‟s perceived zone of 
influence like Myanmar, Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh, or zone of competitions for many 
other powers like African ports and 
Mediterranean. Obviously,   China‟s 
investment in these specific ports has been 
fueling a range of concerns in regional and 
global players and is being portrayed as 
China‟s “grand strategy” to secure sizeable 
influence in Indian Ocean in the sugar coated 
slogan of “community of shared future” in the 
first place.  
 However, for China, the last year‟s 
Xi‟s revitalized determination to broaden 
market access and expand imports in the face 
of greater opening-up(Baijie, 2018) has 
increasingly elevated the strategic standing of 
the (SLOCs). Being an export-oriented 
economy with ever growing demands of 
energy imports, China‟s survival and 
prosperity is closely tied to the free seaborne 
trade. 
Haiyang Qiangguo: China as a Maritime 
Power 
We should pay close attention to both 
development and security. The former 
is the foundation of the latter while the 
latter is a precondition for the former. 
A wealthy country may build a strong 
army, and a strong army is able to 
safeguard a country (Jinping, 2014) 
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sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and national unity; third, the basic 
guarantee for sustainable economic 
and social development of China. 
No violation of these interests will 
be allowed (Bingguo, 2010).
On September 6, 2011, the 
State Council released a white 
paper entitled China's Peaceful 
Development, which once again 
defined and highlighted ensured 
ensuring sustainable economic 
as Chin’s core national interests 
along others(White Paper, 2011). 
Chinese policy making circle views 
energy security in both strategic and 
economic terms to keep industries 
moving for sustainable economic 
developme t.
In e backdrop of its strategic-
vulnerability in terms of energy 
security, China has long since been 
investing in different sea ports 
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along the important SLOCs for 
commercial purposes. How many 
of these ports situated either India’s 
perceived zone of influence like 
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, 
or zone of competitions for many 
other powers like African ports and 
Mediterranean. Obviously, China’s 
investment in these specific ports 
has been fueling a range of concerns 
in regional and global players and 
is being portrayed as China’s “grand 
strategy” to secure sizeable influence 
in Indian Ocean in the sugar coated 
slogan of “community of shared 
future” in the first place. 
 However, for China, the last 
year’s Xi’s revitalized determination 
to broaden market access and 
expand imports in the face of 
greater opening-up(Baijie, 2018) 
has increasingly elevated the 
strategic standing of the (SLOCs). 
Being an export-oriented economy 
with ever growing demands of 
energy imports, China’s survival and 
prosperity is closely tied to the free 
seaborne trade.
Haiyang Qiangguo: China as a 
Maritime Power
We should pay close attention to 
both development and security. The 
former is the foundation of the latter 
while the latter is a precondition for 
the former. A wealthy country may 
build a strong army, and a strong 
army is able to safeguard a country 
(Jinping, 2014)
Piracy, natural disaster and due 
to power politics, China prompted 
to place extra-ordinary focus on 
development for strong naval 
muscles to cope with the threats. 
For this purpose, President Xi 
has continued the call to develop 
China into a maritime power 
(People.cn, 2013). During policy 
discussion session with members 
of the Political Bureau of the CPC 
Central Committee in July 2013, Xi 
noted that in the 21st century, the 
ocean has an increased vital role 
to play in economic development 
and opening to the outside world. 
For playing a key role in the global 
governance through maritime 
power as an instrument of national 
power, China unveiled important 
blue prints of connectivity across 
the already disturbed waters under 
the banner of 21st century Maritime 
Silk Road (MSR). The plan was 
announcedin October 2013 in 
Indonesian parliament by Chinese 
President Xi Jinping during his 
official visit. MSR has multi-
pronged aspects that covers various 
areas from commercial facilitator to 
strategic launching- pad. 
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Why and What India Does 
Concern?
Two important sea ports, 
Gwadar in CPEC and Kyaukopyu in 
BCIMEC ensure the China’s direct 
access to the Arabian Sea in the west 
of India and in the Bay of Bengal in 
its east. While Indian "strategically 
important" Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands are also exist in this sub 
region of the Indian Ocean, the Bay 
of Bengal. For India, these islands 
have massive strategic importance. 
But in power politics, the strength 
of one measures the weakness of 
the adversary. For China, Andaman 
and Nicobar card up to some extent 
is lingering sword over its energy 
import and trade export (short to 
Malacca dilemma) in case of any 
conflict. In strategic terms it can be 
safe to say that China’s investment 
in Myanmar Port, the northernmost 
part of the Andaman and Nicobar 
is only 22 nautical miles away from 
Myanmar, might serve two fold 
purposes in future: a reliable base 
for naval presence (as staying or 
fuelling station) to counter Indian’s 
Andaman card and second to evade 
partially the Malacca dilemma to get 
direct access to China via Myanmar.
In Southwest of India China’s 
investments in the “strategically 
important” Gwadar port have also 
been perceived as an important 
package for the so-called the String 
of Pearls. India largely downplays 
its economic aspects and projects 
it as Sino-Pak joint strategic move 
against India. The vital reason 
for India’s triggered worrisome is 
Gwadar’s geographical position. 
In South West of India’s 
Lakshadweep Islands, China is 
bolstering Pakistan’s strategic 
strength that in return is 
supplementing China’s strategic 
presence at and around Gwadar 
port. In this regard, China has 
provided maritime patrolling boats 
and inked agreement for selling of 
8 AIP submarine to Pakistan(China 
to provide eight submarines to 
Pakistan, 2016) which raised Indian 
concerns.
This India perceived two-
pronged investment in Gawadar and 
Myanmar’s Ports on one side at the 
tip of Strait of Hormuz is breeding 
‘Hormuz syndrome’ for India while 
on the other hand it is defying 
the India’s “Ring of Steel”. In the 
context of the energy security, for 
India Straits of Hormuz is standing 
on equal footing as Malacca Strait 
stands for China. While Andaman 
and Nicobar are a “very important 
aspect” of India’s security, acting as 
extended arms of the country(Daily 
News and Analysis (DNA), 2015).
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Indian booming industries are 
also heavily dependent on energy 
imports from various parts of the 
world. The Middle Eastern region 
contributes a large fraction of its 
oil imports. The share of Middle-
East nations stood at 64 per cent 
in 2017-2018 as compare to 61 per 
cent in financial year 2013-2014(ET 
EnergyWorld, 2018). Much of 
Indian oil shipments from the 
Middle East have to sail through the 
Strait of Hormuz. In this regard, to 
counter balance the India’s possible 
hostile ambitions in Nicobar and 
Andaman nothing but Gwadar is a 
pragmatic choice. 
 Chinese presence in Bay of 
Bengal through its investment in 
Myanmar and Bangladeshi ports 
has struck the alarming bells in New 
Delhi. The triggered worrisome of 
the encirclement put Indian naval 
modernization and proactive 
intelligence sharing with the US, 
Japan and France on more fast track. 
The misdiagnosed sensing from 
China has forced India towards more 
proactive diplomacy for assuming 
the lead under ‘Act East Policy’ in 
the South East Asian. However, 
India’s geographical position in the 
Indian Ocean and its national power 
elements make it easy to galvanize 
the support of many resented littoral 
states of the Indian Ocean. To give 
an alternative infrastructural avenue 
and to break the MSR’s seduction, 
Modi’s government came up with 
its own version of MSR, Project 
Mausam (Pillalamarri, 2014). The 
sundry developments in the waters 
of Indian Ocean region can interlock 
India and China in perpetual naval 
up gradation.
An Indian Ocean Trifecta 
Two regional states, India 
and China, and one extra regional 
state America have emerged as key 
strategic and economic players in 
the third largest water body of the 
planet. In Indian Ocean Region 
(IOR) America and China have 
been struggling to reaffirm and 
foment alliance network. In this 
regard, for America, India is the 
most suitable counter-weight to 
China. US had already bestowed 
India the status of linchpin(Datt, 
2012) in its rebalancing policy and 
firmly expressed its commitments 
for making India a great power. 
India’s massive population, over 
stretched land, the oldest history 
and aspirations to be a great power 
are multiple variables that make it 
an appropriate strategic western paw 
for countering China. However, in 
this equation the sense of “strategic 
autonomy” in Indian policy circle is 
an important intervening variable.
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 On the other side, China is 
bolstering the capacities of India’s 
possible balancer Pakistan. The 
frequency of defence treaties, naval 
exercises and arm sales between 
Sino-Pak are scaling up with every 
passing day in the region. The troika, 
Pakistan, India and China have 
also border flashpoints that have 
intermittently ignited either in full-
fledged wars or border skirmishes. 
In nutshell, US policy to contain 
China would be up to some extent 
incomplete or at least in greater 
troubles in case India asserts the 
element of its strategic autonomy.
However, in realistic view, US 
and India see Chinese investments 
through traditional geo-political lens 
and totally overruled infrastructural 
aspects. In seas, Chinese investment 
is being perceived as practical 
implementation of Alfred T. 
Mahan’s advice for controlling 
Nicholas J. Spykman’s coined idea 
of the Rimland. Many of MSR’s 
ports are located on Spykman’s 
defined Rimland that encircle 
the Mackinder’s Heart Land what 
all fluctuate US-Indo strategic 
perception in this part of the world. 
Further, in sundry places Chinese 
investment in different ports by 
default counter the already US or 
Indian established naval bases or 
other relevant installation.
The other striking fact of 
this competition is China’s larger 
economic base unlike cold war 
contest. Unlike USSR, CPC’s 
legitimacy has been confirmed by 
its economic progress, which is 
standing on western liberal system. 
However, back in 20th century USSR 
was totally (economic and political 
system) running under communist 
principles. However, China is 
partially following communist 
paradigm while underscore the 
liberal system for its economic 
boom. The ‘half beast, half man’ 
principle can be applied on China 
administrative and economic 
paradigms. China’s liberal economic 
system as ‘half man’ is enhancing 
its economic clout where its 
authoritative regime is ‘half beast’ 
which is both internal and external 
stumbling block. China is being 
delivered by Deng Xiaoping’s given 
liberal economic system but under 
Mao’s communist political order. 
The former put China on position 
where it emerged as America’s 
economic challenger while the later 
has been hampering its true national 
integrity and global outreach. The 
liberal element of China makes 
it more steadfast and competent 
competitor than USSR. 
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Strategic Aspects of Maritime Silk 
Road (MSR) 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, a Uni-
ted States Navy flag officer, geo-
strategist, and historian, said; that 
naval blockade can defeat strongest 
enemy. In both World Wars naval 
blockade played important roles in 
the victories of the “allied forces”. Due 
to advancement of communications 
in the new geopolitical realities 
maritime routes, ports and trade 
hold greater importance. To control 
these maritime routes, China has 
employed its massive investments 
in different ports. More than 
90 per cent of China's trade" is 
carried out through sea lanes. The 
trade shipment is fast but much 
expansive as compare to cheapest 
sea borne trade. Keeping in mind 
the importance of sea routs, there 
is higher possibilities that China 
will supply most of its goods in the 
future by sea. In order to replace 
a single modern container ship, 
up to 300 trains can be needed. 
Beijing knows and recognizes the 
massive importance and its larger 
concentration on developing, 
investing on different sea ports and 
modernizing its navy in order to 
keep check and provide security to 
its trade and energy shipments.
The rise of India, China and 
other stakeholders of the global 
politics has speeded up the process 
of multi-polarity. China had 
already furthered its claim for vital 
position and role under catching 
phrase of ‘China’s role in global 
governance’ (Zhongying, 2016). In 
the developing and developed states 
owning to the heavy dependence on 
trade, both for raw materials to fuel 
economies and to ship their exports 
abroad, the command of seas is an 
important instrument to ensure the 
stable flow of maritime shipments 
aside geo strategic bargaining. The 
need for maritime security has been 
pushing various states towards naval 
up gradations, naval exercises and 
naval alliance system. This reshaping 
hierarchy of choices in foreign 
policies has been shifting the focus 
from land-based alliances towards 
maritime security communities. 
In realistic paradigm, power 
always comes at the cost of other. 
China’s maritime security quest to 
overcome its security dilemma in 
IOR obviously is putting adverse 
effects on other players especially 
India and America. In 2012 
according to The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
published annual Military Balance 
established that Asian spending on 
defence surpassed that of Europe. 
The size of defence budgets have 
been equally soaring with Sino-
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India economic boom and in future 
the trend will be on increase. It is 
documented that Asian economic 
growth proportionally increased 
its defence spending as well. Dr 
LucieBéraud-Sudreau, responsible 
for the collection and assessment 
of data on defence budgets and 
defence industry for The Military 
Balance and Military Balance, 
asserts the direct relations between 
economic rise and defence 
expenditures(Béraud-Sudreau, 
2017). After years of strong growth 
of more than 5% in real terms, Asia’s 
total defence expanding plummeted 
to 1.4% between 2016 and 2017. The 
vital cause for this decline has been 
economic slowdown in both China 
and India.
Conclusion 
MSR is initiated on economic 
lines and being projected as vital 
engine for economic growth and 
integration. No doubt, the standard 
model for economic integration 
has been European Union (EU). 
However, European economic 
integration became only possible 
when the existing territorial 
disputes had been overcome and 
extinguished all the ashes which 
could have engulfed Western 
Europe in war or just short of war. 
The success of MSR could only 
be possible when stakeholders in 
South China Sea and East China Sea 
conflicts would been able to sort out 
their differences amicably .
Next to the territorial disputes 
are China’s internal problems. China 
has been facing two fold territorial 
challenges both external to 
mainland and internal on mainland, 
China-Taiwan issue and territorial 
issues on mainland China. Xinjing 
and Tibet’s true integration is 
necessary if China truly be seen real 
and responsible power. Otherwise, 
the existing bicker in Xinjing 
would been pressing vein of China 
for western propaganda machine 
human rights watch dogs once 
again(Watson & Westcott, 2019).
The most important aspect of 
Chinese investment is the gene-
rated perception of the “Debt-
trap diplomacy”. China must take 
appropriate steps to dispel the 
notion. The first thing for China 
is to read deeply and take care of 
the national interests of the various 
states. It should avoid being the 
part of the domestic politics of 
the different states. In many states 
going governments used China’s 
investments as their election 
campaign manifestos. And in many 
states, from Sri Lanka to Malaysia, 
Maldives and Pakistan new 
governments felt irritation from 
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previously concluded agreements. 
The domestic fault-lines in these 
countries are mainly playing the 
role of time bombs for Chinese 
investments. China should take 
consider the small states, their 
domestic politics dynamics and 
national consensus trajectory. One 
China completes homework it ought 
to tailor- made its investment mode 
accordingly. 
The need and hope for eco no-
mic gain is one of the distinguished 
elements that are bringing together 
a number of states with diverse 
histories, political systems and 
territorial disputes towards Beijing. 
The designed distribution of 
economic dividends has initially 
mustered sizeable support and 
participation in China’s initiated 
MSR. However, fragile strategic 
perception of US and India and 
divergent themes for global 
administration has put various 
question marks on unfolding 
initiative. 
MSR has positive economic 
and infrastructural effects for 
smaller states connecting them 
with each other and with Beijing 
through maritime routs. However, 
both opposing blocs have historical 
nightmares that are totally changing 
the outlook of the economic 
based initiatives. For China, 
MSR is important milestone for 
safeguarding SLOCs and to avoid the 
incidents like Yinhe (ChinaDaily, 
1993) - where America stopped 
Chinese freighter that had been 
suspected by American intelligence 
of carrying poison gas ingredients 
to Iran. 
Both India and China are 
largely under the burden of their 
bitter histories while America is 
to maintain the status quo in the 
Indian Ocean Region. China’s 
investment under the banner of 
MSR, by default, has saboteur 
impacts for the US hegemony and 
status-que while for India scare to be 
overwhelmed. Additionally, power 
influx phenomena acts as catalyst 
for this strategic competition. In 
this power transition process and in 
the middle of the structural changes 
various stakeholders are locked in 
zero-sum-game competition for 
proper place in the re-configuration 
process of international world order. 
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